


Compensation Policy 2025



Compensation Policy 2025

Governance

The governance bodies of the Company are a) the Board of Directors ("Board"), b) its committees and c) the Executive Committee ("EC"). The Articles of Association and Rules of Procedure outline

and define the roles and responsibilities of these bodies. The key points regarding compensation are summarized in the table below. For further details, see the Corporate Governance Report.

Activity	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026
AGM	AGM 2025	AGM 2026	
Binding vote for BoD compensation for period AGM 2025– AGM 2026			
Binding vote for EC compensation for financial year 2026			
Consultative vote on Compensation Report 2024			

Annual Process and Responsibilities for Compensation of EC and Board

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Annual Performance Assessment for non-CEO EC members for previous financial year	CEO, NCSC			
Annual Performance Assessment for CEO for previous financial year	Chair, BoD			
Calculation of Variable Bonus (STI) for EC members for previous financial year	CEO*, NCSC, BoD			
PSU grant (LTI) proposal for EC members for previous financial year	CEO*, NCSC, BoD			
Maximum aggregate compensation amount of the EC for next financial year (AGM+1)	NCSC, BoD	AGM		
Compensation of Board of Directors for next compensation period (AGM to AGM+1)	NCSC, BoD	AGM		
Compensation Policy and Report for previous financial year	NCSC, BoD	AGM**		
Annual BoD Evaluation		Chair, BoD		
Planning and guidance of ESG measures		CEO, NCSC, BoD		CEO, NCSC, BoD
Release of ESG/Sustainability Report	CEO, NCSC, BoD			
Annual EC and BoD Succession Planning Review		NCSC, BoD		
Compensation policy review and compensation principles for next financial year (including compensation benchmarking tri-annually)			NCSC, BoD	
Compensation plans, budget and share award plan design				CEO*, NCSC, BoD

* CEO is not present when discussing his compensation, ** Consultative vote

■ body which recommends, ■ body which reviews, ■ body which approves

BoD = Board, NCSC = Nomination, Compensation and Sustainability Committee, CEO = Chief Executive Officer

Objectives/Benchmarking

Board of Directors Compensation

The compensation policy for the Board of Directors is designed to attract and retain experienced and motivated individuals for the Board. The compensation should be competitive and appropriate in relation to the market and ensure the Board's independence in its supervisory capacity of the EC and the Company.

EC Compensation

- **Competitive**

The total compensation package is competitive, enabling u-blox to attract and retain highly skilled and motivated entrepreneurial executive leaders over the long term.

- **Alignment of Interests**

The form of compensation provides an incentive to achieve a sustainable increase in shareholder value, thus ensuring an alignment of interest between the EC and the long-term interests of shareholders.

- **Reward Performance and Team Spirit**

The compensation system is designed to promote medium- and long-term success and to foster team spirit among EC members. Compensation that is independent of performance, guaranteed or discretionary, and in particular, "pay for failure" is avoided. The achievements of Key Performance Indicators are rewarded as team achievement.

- **Fair and Transparent**

The compensation decisions are fair and transparent based on function and level of responsibility and ensuring that variable components are based on agreed and clear measurable performance metrics in line with the company's KPIs.

Compensation Benchmarking

The NCSC reviews the actual compensation of members of the Board and the EC annually and conducts periodic reviews of the compensation policy, levels, or structure for these bodies, respectively. Any changes resulting from these reviews are submitted to the Board for review and then for approval and decision at the AGM.

Board of Directors Benchmarking

On a regular basis, the Board of Director's compensation is reviewed for appropriateness with workload and increase in required competencies mainly driven by new regulations and shareholder expectations. The most recent review of the Board of Directors' compensation was undertaken during the financial year 2024. The results of which are that the Board of Directors compensation should be as follows with a split between a cash-based component and a share-based component, effective AGM2025.

Period AGM 2025 through AGM 2026		
Board compensation including social insurance	Cash	Stock value
Base Compensation for Chair of the Board	CHF 182,000	CHF 78,000
Base Compensation for member of the Board	CHF 77,000	CHF 33,000
Additional compensation for committee Chair	CHF 17,500	CHF 7,500
Additional compensation for committee membership	CHF 10,500	CHF 4,500

Actual expenses incurred are reimbursed, according to the company policy, for travel arising out of duties performed on behalf of the Board. No pension, social insurance contributions, or benefits are granted to the Board members, except where compulsory under Swiss law. Employer contributions to social insurance for Board members are included in the compensation amount.

Board of Directors Share Ownership Requirements

Board share ownership guidelines were introduced for the Board in 2018. This guideline stipulates that each member will acquire and hold u-blox shares equivalent to 100% of the annual Board fee. The minimum levels are to be achieved within three years, and such achievement is not altered by later share price variation. Details on the shareholding of members of the Board are provided in the Corporate Governance Report under Shareholdings, Compensation and Loans.

Executive Committee Benchmarking

To assess the competitiveness of the level and structure of the compensation framework for the Executive Committee, the NCSC conducts a review on a tri-annual basis, also considering market and regulatory developments. The review is supported by external consultants. As a reference point, peer median compensation should not be exceeded.

The most recent review was conducted during the financial year 2024. To this end, Executive Committee members' total compensation was benchmarked against a peer group selected to reflect the size, geographic considerations as well as industries affiliation in a broader sense. The particular focus of this benchmarking was on the local governance landscape and compensation practices. The benchmark was split into two groups to enable distinction between organizations with a more significant market capitalization.

Company	Business activity
VAT	Industrials
MELEXIS	Information Technology
NORDIC	Information Technology
AMS-OSRAM	Information Technology
COMET	Information Technology
HUBER+SUHNER	Industrials
TX GROUP	Communication Services
SENSIRION	Information Technology
ARYZTA	Consumer Staples
MEYER-BURGER	Information Technology
KOMAX	Industrials
ELMOS	Information Technology
JUNGFRAUBAHN	Industrials
ARBONIA	Industrials
MEDMIX	Healthcare
AUTONEUM	Consumer Discretionary
MOBILEZONE	Consumer Discretionary
ZEHNDER	Industrials
VETROPACK	Materials
APG SGA	Communication Services
V-ZUG	Consumer Discretionary
ORIOR	Consumer Staples
RIETER	Industrials

SWISS STEEL	Materials
GURIT	Materials

The conducted benchmark overall showed that the current target compensation level, the use of compensation elements, and the way the short-term variable compensation element is set are comparable to the market. The market insights obtained were further considered in the design of the long-term incentive (LTI, PSUs), including the value of the annual grant.

Compensation System for the Board of Directors

To ensure the independence of the Board of Directors in its supervisory capacity of the Executive Committee and the company, members of the Board of Directors only receive a fixed compensation and do not participate in the Company's LTI schemes, non-mandatory pension schemes, and/or performance-related pay. In addition to the base director fees, a fixed fee is paid for the positions of Chair, Committee Chair, and Committee Member. In addition, the Chair of the Board of Directors is not eligible for additional compensation for participation in committees.

The compensation is paid out in the form of a cash and a stock component effective from AGM2025-26. The payment and stock delivery mechanism is as follows;


- Stock valuation in number of share calculation end of December.
- Stock delivery at AGM
- Cash payment incl. tax deduction for both components (including stock component) made of the first working day after dividend payment or approximatively 2 weeks after AGM in case of no dividend is paid in that given year

Compensation System for Executive Committee

The compensation of the EC members consists of fixed elements (including base salary, pension funds, social insurance, and other benefits) and variable elements based on performance (including short-term incentive "STI" and long-term incentive "LTI"). A greater portion of the overall compensation is dependent upon performance.

However, this is capped not to incentivize excessive risk-taking or maximize short-term performance at the risk of long-term sustainable performance. EC members are not compensated for Board membership nor other executive positions held within the Group.

Illustrative overview of the compensation framework of the Executive Committee



Summarized compensation elements of the Executive Committee

	Instrument	Timeframe	Performance-related	Purpose
Fixed Elements	Cash	Immediate	Not relevant	Attraction, retention
Short-term Incentive (STI)	Cash	1 year	Yes	Reward achievement of pre-determined KPIs for financial year, including but not limited to ESG goals.
Long-term Incentive (LTI)	Performance Share Units (PSUs)	3 years	Yes	Long-term commitment and reward achievement of pre-determined KPIs for three year-period, alignment of interests, foster team-spirit.

Base Salary

The base salary is the main fixed compensation component paid to the Executive Committee members. It is determined by taking into account the regular benchmarking results and considering the tasks, responsibilities, and experience relevant to the respective role. As roles and responsibilities change, the NCSC will review salaries accordingly.

Pension Funds and Social Insurance

The aim is to provide the Executive Committee members and their family members with financial coverage in case of retirement, illness, invalidity, or death in line with Swiss market practices and regulations.

The members of the Executive Committee, as all eligible employees in Switzerland, are insured against the risks of old age, death, and disability (AHV). With respect to pension benefits (amounts that give rise to pension entitlements or increase pension benefits), the employer contributes 60% of the obligatory pension scheme fees and approximately 65% of the non-obligatory private pension scheme fees.

Other Benefits

In order to attract and retain talent the Board of Directors reserves the right to grant other benefits for Executive Committee members as needed in exceptional cases.


Short-Term Incentive (STI)

The STI is designed to reward the achievement of three Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which reflect the interest of shareholders and focus on growth, profitability, and sustainability. Specifically:

- 1) Revenue,
- 2) Cash EBIT Margin²⁾
- 3) Free cash flow Margin
- 4) ESG (measured by several achievement levels of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)).

To determine the actual cash payout received by participants following the financial year, the Board of Directors calculates a weighted overall achievement factor by comparing the actual results achieved to the pre-determined targets per KPI. The weighted overall achievement factor is applied to the respective base salary for each participant.

Illustrative overview of STI framework



1) CEO STI base = 100% base salary; CEO STI payout cap = 150% of base salary

2) Cash EBIT: Excludes R&D amortization, capitalization and restructuring costs; this is the closest metric to cash impact

Performance Peer Group for 2025 targets

ams OSRAM

ELMOS Semiconductor

Fibocom Wireless

Impinj

Melexis

Nordic Semiconductor

Quectel Wireless Solutions

Sensirion AG

Silicon Laboratories

Long Term Incentive (LTI)


The LTI should encourage the long-term commitment of the Executive Committee, promote the alignment of long-term interests between shareholders and the Executive Committee, and foster team spirit at u-blox.

At the beginning of each three-year plan cycle, an individual LTI grant amount (CHF) is converted into a certain number of PSUs. Whereby a PSU represents a contingent entitlement to receive u-blox shares in the future subject to fulfillment of pre-defined performance conditions.

The individual LTI grant amounts are proposed by the NCSC, taking into account market data and internal company considerations on the proportionality of compensation, overall affordability, and dilution, and are approved by the Board of Directors for each annual grant.

The number of granted PSUs is calculated by dividing an individual LTI grant amount (CHF) by the reference price of a PSU at the time of grant. The reference price is determined using the lower average daily closing price of the u-blox share over the ten trading days prior to the grant date or the closing price on the last trading day before the grant date.

At the end of each three-year plan cycle, granted PSUs are converted into u-blox shares. The number of shares per PSU varies from 0% to 150%, depending on the achievement of predefined performance conditions. Effective from grant 2025, the performance conditions are defined as the weighted average over three years of the Cash EBIT margin and u-blox's relative TSR compared to the SPI Extra index over the period. Social contributions fall due at the vesting date.



- 1) Individual LTI amount defined yearly, reference price definition in the compensation report
- 2) Cash EBIT : Excludes R&D amortization, capitalization and restructuring costs; this is the closest metric to cash impact
- 3) TSRr = relative TSR performance vs. SPI EXTRA

The maximum compensation amounts are as approved by the shareholders at the Annual General Meeting.

Malus and claw-back provisions

Under the LTI applicable until 2022, the malus and claw-back provisions apply to forfeit or recover payments made as bonus (STI) and under the LTI-ESOP. Such provisions cover situations where the company is required to restate its accounts due to non-compliance with financial reporting requirements under the securities laws at the time of disclosure. In such cases, the Board of Directors is empowered to recalculate the respective payout according to the restated financial results and seek reimbursement of any bonus amount or LTI-ESOP grant allocated in excess of the newly calculated amount. The claw-back clause is applicable for three years after the payment or grant of the respective compensation. Under the LTI PSU, the malus and claw back provisions apply when the Company is required to restate its accounts due to non-compliance with financial reporting requirements at the time of disclosure or any act or failure to act that violates the law or a breach of obligations under the employment contract.

Where the Company is required to restate its accounts, the Board of Directors is empowered to recalculate the respective Achievement Factor according to the restated financial results and request the return of any u-blox Shares transferred to Participants under the Plan.

In case of an act or failure to act which violates the law or a breach of obligations under the employment contract, the Board of Directors defines the number of PSUs to

be canceled and the amount or the number of u-blox Shares to be returned according to the seriousness of the violation and the damage caused to the company.

The claw-back clause is applicable for three years after the vesting of the respective PSU.

Approach to recruitment compensation

The NCSC ensures any arrangements agreed to be in the best interests of u-blox and its shareholders and aims to pay no more than necessary to secure the right candidate. Where considered appropriate, an external candidate may be compensated for compensation arrangements forfeited on leaving a previous employer. In doing so, relevant factors, including any performance conditions attached to these awards, the form in which it was to be paid, and the timeframe of awards, are considered. Buyout awards would be awarded on a 'like for like' basis compared to compensation being forfeited and would be capped to reflect the value being forfeited. The maximum level of variable pay, which could be awarded to a new Executive Committee member, excluding any buyouts, would be in line with the policy set out. If an Executive Committee member is appointed following u-blox's acquisition of, or merger with, another company, legacy terms and conditions may be honored.

Employment contracts

The employment contracts of the Executive Committee members have a six-month notice period. The contracts do not contain a clause relating to change of control. Executive Committee members may be subject to non-compete provisions upon termination of their employment contract, which will not exceed 12 months after the termination date. If an Executive Committee member terminates the employment contract, the company may trigger the non-compete obligation in exchange for a fee limited to 50% of the Executive Committee member's annual cash compensation. Regarding the LTI, Executive Committee members or any participants are not entitled to any contractual joining or severance payments or special change of control provisions, except for the early vesting of the long-term compensation plan as explained in the plan regulations.

Loans

No guarantees or loans are granted to members of the Board of Directors or the Executive Committee.

Share Ownership Requirements

Executive Committee members are required to acquire and hold u-blox shares equivalent to 250% of the base salary for the CEO and 200% for the other Executive Committee members. To fulfill the individual Shareholding Requirements, each member of the Executive Committee is granted a four-year build-up period. Executive Committee members need to fulfil their Shareholding requirement within four years after the date of entry at u-blox. An Executive Committee member's shareholdings for the purpose of this regulation shall include shares owned and PSU awards granted under the LTI. Upon completion of the build-up period, an achievement will not be altered by a later share price variation. Details on the shareholding of Executive Committee members are provided in the Corporate Governance Report under the section Shareholdings.